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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~\MERICAN MUD & CHEMICAIJ 
f()l\IPANY, and AMERICAN 
SURET\T C'OMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
I :.J !)US TRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UT~~\ H, and BYRON DAVIES, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10111 
X~~TURE OF THE CASE 
This matter comes before the ·Supreme Court 
of Utah on Petition of the plaintiffs to review the 
proceedings and the Orders of the Industrial Com-
Ini~sion of Utah awarding Byron Davies benefits 
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for total disability by reason of silicosis under the 
Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law and to 
determine whether Davies' claim for occupational 
disease was filed within the time required by law. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMIS·SION 
Upon application of Byron D~avies filed April 
9, 1962, for a claim for Occupational Disease Bene-
fits the Industrial Comission had the applicant ex-
amined by a medical panel and following ~a hearing 
October 22, 1962, which was continued and concluded 
Decen1ber 28, 1962, the Commission on November 
18, 1963, made an order finding that Davies was 
totally and permanently disabled as a result of sili-
cosis and ordered the American Mud & Chemical 
Company and the American Surety Company, its 
insurer, to pay occupational disease compensation 
benefits totaling $15,415.00 for disability plus medi-
cal and hospital expenses not to exceed $1,9,25.01. 
A petition by the plaintiffs for rehearing and for 
a hearing de novo on the grounds of newly discov-
ered evidence were denied by the Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN PEITITiON 
The plain tiffs in this review proceeding seek 
to have the Supreme Court reverse the Order of the 
Co1nmission granting Byron Davies an award for 
total pern1anent disability. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Byron Davies is 55 years old. He has had four 
years college training as a geologist. ( R-33, 35, 5J) 
He has spent most of his life since 1929 working in 
underground mining, and it is not disputed that 
out of the last fifteen years of his work history, 
at least five years 'have been spent in underground 
rnining activities~·in Utah. (R-37 through 40) In 
February 19'57 he started work as a foreman of an 
open pit' Be toni te mine located· at Cannonville, Utah. 
( R--11) The mine was opera ted by the Bentonite 
(\n·poration of America and was later taken over 
the American Mud an·d Chemical Company, which 
continued to operate it until it was closed down 
December 31, 1960. (R-68) The Betonite ore con~ 
tained free silica which tested. around 7 7o. ( R-49) 
In June of 1960 Davies became concerned about 
his shortness of breath and a c·hronic .cough. He 
consulted Dr. William M~ason at the Panguitch 
L. D. S. Hospital. X-r~ys were taken and. h~ was 
referred to the Rumel C1hest Clinic. in _·Salt Lake 
City for further studies and diagnosis. S~.-~7-~ 58) 
On June 13, 1960, Davies was exa~ined by 
Dr. J. D. Mortensen a chest surgeon associ9-ted with 
the Rumel Clinic. (R-119) He gave a history of 
difficulty in breathing and a chronic cough that had 
been progressive for four months. He suspected that 
he has silicosis and wanted an examination to de-
termine \Yhether he did or not. (R-119, 120, 121, 
3 
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122). Upon completion of his examination includ-
ing tests at the L. D. S. Hospital in S~alt Lake City 
Dr. Mortensen concluded that Davies had advanced 
silicosis and diffuse bronchitis and so advised him 
suggesting that he should contact the Industrial 
Commission. ( R-62, 128 Exnibit 4). 
Davies returned to his work at the Betonite 
mine where he remained until the mine was closed 
down at his request because of the dust situation 
December 31, 1960. (R-67, 68). He engaged in no 
physical labor after that date, but claims to have 
inspected some mining property as a geology con-
sul tan t and prep~ared a report in November and 
December of 1961, for which he was paid $500.00. 
(R-69, 70, 71). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BYRON DAVIES DTD N·OT FILE HIS CLAIM FOR 
TOTAL DISABILITY RESULTING FROM AN OCCU-
PATIONAL DISEASE WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED 
BY SECTION 35-2-48(a) U'CA 1953. 
Section 35-2-13 (a) Subsection ( 4) provides: 
''No claim shall be maintained nor compensa-
tion paid unless the claim has been filed ~ith 
the Commission in writing within the time 
fixed by the appropriate subdivision of Sec-
tion 3'5-2-48." 
Section 35-2-48 provides : 
''The right to compensate under thi~ ·act f~r 
disability or death from an occupational di-
4 
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sease shall be forever barred unless written 
claim is filed with the Commission within 
the time as in this section hereinafter pro-
vided: 
(a) If the claim is made by an em-
ployee and based upon silicosis it must be filed 
within one year after the cause of action 
arises.'' 
Byron Davies filed his claim in writing with 
the Comn1ission on April 9, 1962. T·he Commission 
in its Order dated November 18, 1963, made no 
finding as to when Davies became disabled or when 
his cause of action arose 'and it is therefore neces-
sary to look to the record and to applicable case 
law in order to determine whether his claim was 
filed in time. 
Davies' claim is for total disability resulting 
fro1n silicosis. the Statutes require th,at such a claim 
\viii be forever barred unless filed within a year 
from the time the cause of action arises. When did 
his cause of action arise? The court had before it 
this same question in the case of State Insurance 
Fund vs. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 279, 209 
P.2d 553. It was held there that: 
.. The better rule which is in accord with 
reason and justice, is that a cause of action 
does not arise until an ascertainable dis-
ability and compensable disaibility results. 
The Court in reaching its decision adopted the rule 
laid down in California as set out in M~arsh vs. In-
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dustrial Accident Commission, 18 P.2d 9'33, where 
the court held that the limitations period did not 
co1nr.aence to run until: 
"The time when the accumul1ated effects cul-
minate in a disability traceable to the latent 
d~sease as the primary cause and by the exer-
Cise of reasonable care .and diligence it is dis-
coverable and ,apparent that a compensable 
injury v1as sustained." · · 
Applying the rule and reasoning set out in the 
State lns. Fund and the M,arsh cases, supra, when 
did Dav~es first have an ascertainable compensable 
disability? He had formal trainin·g .. as a geologist. 
He had worked in underground :-mining for m~any 
years. He was acquainted with free silica and that 
it was a causitive factor in a disease commonly 
found in miners, kn~wii ··as silicosis. (R-'51, 60). He 
knev1 th~a.t there were appreciable quantities of silica 
in the ·Bentonite dust at the Cannonville mine where 
he had worked and had made frequent tests for 
silica for some three years. (R-41, 49). Because 
of ·a chronic cough and shortness of breath which 
had been progressive for· four months; in June of 
19GO he sought 1nedical attention. He was concern~ 
ed about lung~ cancer. (R-64, 65); but ·he also told 
Dr. lVIortensen on examination that he suspected 
that he had silicosis and that he ,wanted to know 
\V~Jcthe:i'" he had it or not (R~121, 122). Fotlowing 
an extensive e~~1n1ination by Dr. Mortensen in his 
office and ~t the hospital Davies was advised that 
6 
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he had a case of advance<l silicosis and was told 
that he should contact the Industrial Commission. 
( R-6G, 128). 
It seen1s clear that as early as June of 1960 
Davies knew that he had silicosis and was in fact 
told that he should contact the Industrial Commis-
. 
SlOfl. 
Having ascertained in June of 1960 that he 
had silicosis, what is the evidence that Davies knew 
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence it should 
haYe been apparent to ·him, that he had sustained 
a con1pensable injury? 
Following his hospitalization he returned to 
the job at Cannonville until December 31, 19'60 when 
the operation was shut down. During this time the 
n1ill operated about one-half of the time. ( R-66.) 
Part of his work was supervisory only. (R-74). He 
performed no physical labor after December 31, 
1960. (R-69). 
In a recorded interview with John Nelson, an 
investigator for the American Surety Company fol-
lowing the filing of his claim for compensation 
Davies, in answer to a question of whether or not 
he had lost any work because of the silicosis stated 
that he could not work and 'had not worked since 
the mill closed down. ( R-63, 7 0, 71) . 
In filing his Occupational Disease Claim Form 
dated l\'larch 8, 1962, which was filed with. the In-
7 
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dustrial Commission April 9, 1962, Davies stated 
that he had been unable to work because of silicosis 
during the years 1961 and 1962. (R-1). 
At the time of the examination by the Chest 
P,anel on June 16, 1962, Dr. Kilpatrick noted on 
page 1 of the patients history that Davies stated 
that he wor:tt/last December 3'1, 1960; that he had 
done a little geology work but no physical labor 
since that time. (R-15). 
At the hearing Davies testified that in Nov-
einber 1and December, 1961, he was employed as a 
geologist to examine some mining property and to 
prepare a written report for which he was paid 
$500.00; and while plaintiffs have 'Sought by their 
raotion for a hearing de novo and supporting affi-
davit of Billy Davis to refute this testimony, even 
assuming such employment, it is evident th~at Davies 
himself did not consider this to be physical employ-
n1ent. With reference to this he testified ''No phy-
sical labor involved. As I already testified in Nov-
ember and December of 1961, I made a repo~t but 
there was no physical activity involved." (R-69). 
Section 35-2-12 in construing the term "Dis-
ablement" as used in the occupational disease act 
provides: 
" (a) 'Disablement' means the event of be-
coming physically incapacitated by reason of 
an occupational disease as defined in this act 
fron1 performing any work for remuneration 
or pl"ofi t . . . " (emphasis added) 
8 
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The statement of Davies and his conduct as it 
appears fro1n the record clearly establishes that he 
considerE'd himself to be disabled by reason of sili-
to~i~ and totally unable to perforn1 any physical 
\Vork for remuneration or profit after December 
:~1, 1960. Undel' these circumstances, the provisions 
of Sections 35-2-13(a) and 35-2-48(a) U.C.A. 1953 
place the responsibility upon him to file his claim 
in writing with the Indt1strial Commission within A 
yeat· from that date. He did not do this. 
CONCLUSION 
Fol' the foregoing reasons, the Order of the 
Industrial Commission dated November 18, 1963, 
awarding Davies compensation for total disability 
should be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT W. BRANDT 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
909 Kearns Building 
S~alt Lake City, Utah 
ReceiYed a copy of the foregoing this ___________ _ 
day of June, 1964. 
ilii~-~-~-y-~~~--v-~~~~;;i~------------------
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